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ABSTRACT
The Copyright Act' grants certain exclusive rights to authors,
composers, choreographers, and certain other artists. These rights
may be used to bargain for royalty payments from those who make
use of these artists' work. Were Congress to repeal section 109(c)
of the Act,2 visual artists would also have the opportunity to negoti-
ate royalties. Virtually no additional legislation would need be
drafted, for the Copyright Act already conceptualizes a right by
which, but for section 109(c), visual artists might demand royalties
for themselves. The "already conceptualized" right is the section
106(5)3 exclusive right of public display. Unqualified, this display
right, like all other exclusive rights which now support royalties for
artists (e.g., the exclusive right to copy), would survive transfer of
ownership of any material embodiment of an artist's work.
This Note advocates repeal of section 109(c), along with minor
modifications of the current copyright notice procedures, in order
to afford visual artists an exclusive right by which they might negoti-
ate royalties. Others have advocated a royalty for visual artists, but
to date all have modeled their proposals after the French droit de
suite, the artist's inalienable right to a portion of the proceeds on the
resale of her work. The event of resale might indeed fix a royalty for
visual artists. This Note argues, however, that the better alternative
is to grant visual artists what the current Copyright Act grants other
artists (e.g., authors and composers): exclusive but alienable rights,
by which copyright holders might demand royalties for themselves.
Further, this Note explains how effectively the section 106(5)
public display right serves as a right on which to base a royalty. The
section 106(5) right is defined so as to apply only to "public" dis-
plays. Therefore, a private display within the home of the owner of
an art object would not occasion a royalty. The Note cautions, how-
ever, against construing a "fair use" exemption from copyright in
the uses museums make of visual art; for reasons the Note expli-
cates, even not-for-profit museums should not qualify as noninfring-
ing "fair" users of works of art.
Although a royalty for visual artists might be secured with rela-
tive statutory ease, the Note acknowledges that the idea has tradi-
tionally met resistance. This resistance may be attributed to the
common understanding that works of visual art are one-of-a-kind,
and that therefore their creators would not stand to benefit from a
copyright. Indeed, the Note discerns that even those advocates of a
1 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988) [hereinafter referred to in text as "the Copyright
Act" or "the Act"].
2 Id. § 109(c). For the text of section 109(c), see infra text accompanying note 60.
3 Id. § 106(5).
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royalty for visual artists, the proponents of the droit de suite, have
assumed that traditional copyright concepts are inapplicable to the
visual arts.4 The Note attempts to persuade skeptics of a visual art-
ists' royalty that works of visual art are not one-of-a-kind objects at
all. Actually, "original works of art" are more akin to musical and
dramatic performances, which already qualify for protection under
the Copyright Act.
But the notion that works of visual art are "one of a kind" and
hence not amenable to copyright protection is so pervasive that this
Note must be structured to answer it. Part I begins, therefore, by
laying out a theory which fully accounts for and justifies the tradi-
tional notion of copyright inapplicability to visual art. This is the
theory of "authenticity," the idea that works of art are valuable
not because they are physically or aesthetically unique or ir-
reproducible, but rather because they represent a traceable, desira-
ble history. The Note further explicates the theory of authenticity,
to show how it also justifies copyright protection for the visual arts.
That is, the very same theory which supports a definition of visual
art that would preclude copyright applicability argues as well for a
definition of visual art that would presume copyright applicability.
Having thus deconstructed the common justification for Copy-
right Act inhospitability toward the visual arts, Part I proceeds to
show how the Copyright Act already attenuates the definition of
''copy" so as to include many art forms which are hardly manifest in
"copies" at all, but are manifest instead in performances or displays.
Part I concludes by focusing on the particular sections of the Act
relevant to a display-based royalty for visual artists. Understanding
both that works of visual art need not be seen as "one of a kind" and
that the Copyright Act is not in fact inapplicable to works that es-
cape literal reproduction in copies, it should be easier to recognize
that the Act in its present form very nearly accommodates a royalty
for visual artists.
Part II lays out the alternative forms a royalty for visual artists
might take. Given the discussion of Part I, however, the Note argues
against the previously proposed alternative of the droit de suite. In
addition to legitimating fundamentally flawed presumptions about
the needs and desires of artists, the droit de suite suffers from the
same misconceptions about works of visual art that inform argu-
ments altogether hostile to a visual artists' royalty. Part II then
turns to outlining the features and mechanics of a display-based roy-
alty, which might be termed "the exhibition royalty." Such a royalty
would comport with the features of the current Copyright Act expli-
4 This assumption further explains why the droit de suite is cast as an inalienable
right.
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cated in Part I. In short, Part II compares alternative models for a
visual artists' royalty and concludes that the best model is the one
latent in the Copyright Act. In other words, the best model is the
one the Act already provides.
PART I: THE MEANING OF "COPY"
A. "One of a Kind" Need Not Apply
Works of visual art are commonly understood to be "one of a
kind" and necessarily outside effective copyright protection. The
same theory justifying this common understanding argues as well
for the converse, that works of visual art are not "one of a kind" at
all. The statement "One of a kind need not apply" stands, then, for
two antithetical propositions. First, a one-of-a-kind work of visual
art need not apply for copyright protection because such protection
is designed only for copies. Second, the description "one of a kind"
does not apply to an original work of art, and therefore copyright
law may yet be amenable to works of visual art.
1. The Common Understanding
Writers and composers receive royalties; as a matter of course,
painters and sculptors do not.5 Nevertheless, the Copyright Act
protects the work of a painter or sculptor: "Copyright protection
subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression .... Works of authorship include ... pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works .... " 6 Other sections of the Copyright
5 Cf. Timothy M. Sheehan, Why Don't Fine Artists Use Statutory Copyright?-An Empiri-
cal and Legal Survey, 22 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 242 (1975) (lack of education, the notice
requirement, and the concept of limited publication account for fine artists' lack of use
of statutory copyright).
6 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional
.and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photo-
graphs, prints, and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams,
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such
works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned ....
Id § 101.
Paintings and sculpture have been within the scope of federal copyright protection
for more than 100 years:
And be itfurther enacted, That any citizen of the United States, or resident
therein, who shall be the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any
book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print,
or photograph or negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo,
statue, statuary, and of modes or designs intended to be perfected as
works of the fine arts .... shall, upon complying with the provisions of
this act, have the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, complet-
ing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending the same ....
Copyright Act, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870) (emphasis in original).
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Act, however, imply that such copyright protection applies only to
an interest in a work's reproduction: "[T]he exclusive right to
reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in
copies.., includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind
of article .... -"7 Although not phrased to exclude other protections,
this section does not enunciate further protections for copyrighted
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works.
If copyright protection requires in practice the making of re-
productions,8 it follows that painters and sculptors whose work
consists of one-of-a-kind objects do not stand to gain from the pro-
tection and thus do not receive royalties. This, indeed, is the com-
mon interpretation.9 One commentator has reasoned, "copyright is
more effective for writers, for example, than for fine artists, because
the work of an author is specifically produced for multiple use....
[W]ith the fine artist who creates one-of-a-kind pieces, the primary
value is in the original work." 10
2. The Theory of Authenticity Informing the Common Understanding
A sophisticated theory of "authenticity" explains and justifies
the common understanding about the singular nature of works of
7 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1988).
8 But see infra text accompanying notes 55-69 (17 U.S.C. § 106(5) grants graphic
artists exclusive rights to display publicly, subject to limits of 17 U.S.C. § 109(c)).
9 SeeJohn B. Koegel, VLA Perspectives: Memorandum of Support for S. 2796: Introduced
in the 99th Congress by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D. Massachusetts), 11 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
347, 349 (1987). This Memorandum noted:
Unfortunately, the intrinsic nature of distribution for most pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works is different [from works of writers, compos-
ers, choreographers, performing artists and filmmakers]. Since, as a
practical matter, reproductions are not significantly marketable, the vis-
ual artist must gain his entire return from the initial, onetime sale.
1d2; see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.22[A] (1989):
Since economic exploitation of the written word is mainly realized
through reproduction, the right to control the making of copies consti-
tutes the writer's key to the economic fruits of his creative efforts. Not so
with the artist. Reproductions of works of art have not in the past, and
probably still do not to any great extent, represent a meaningful source
of income for most artists. His prime source of income derives from the
sale of the original tangible embodiment of his artistic efforts. The
money an artist receives upon the sale of a painting (even if he has re-
served reproduction rights) probably represents the only income which
he will receive from that particular work.
Id. (footnote omitted); John E. McInerney III, California Resale Royalties Act: Private Sector
Enforcement, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 17 (1984):
Artists who stand to benefit most from the copyright laws are those who
work in multiple originals or whose works are reproduced for mass distri-
bution. This is so because the primary interest protected by copyright is
the right to control reproduction of a given work.
Id (footnote omitted).
10 McInerney, supra note 9, at 17 (footnote omitted).
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visual art and the consequent inapplicability of copyright to works of
visual art. This theory of "authenticity," as explicated chiefly by
Walter Benjamin, appears to be accepted by buyers and sellers of
works of visual art. Furthermore, as Walter Goodman has shown,
the theory of authenticity has an aesthetic function which affirms the
theory's rationality.
a. Benjamin's Theory of Authenticity
The previous deduction," 1 explaining the languid state of copy-
right affairs for most visual artists,1 2 also quietly reinforces an im-
portant belief about the nature of a "work of art" (as the phrase is
used in reference to painting or sculpture). The belief reinforced is
that "works of art" are utterly unique objects. However conven-
tional, this belief is not altogether plausible. Whether intended for
multiple reproduction or not, there is nothing about the physical
object that is a painting or a sculpture that prevents its material re-
production. As Walter Benjamin observed, "[iln principle a work of
art has always been reproducible."1 3 An art object's reproduction
may be apparent as a reproduction, in the form of a photograph, a
postcard, or a slide; or its reproduction may be more difficult to dis-
cern as a reproduction, as with a "forgery" using similar materials
and following identical measurements and dimensions. 14 But in
either case, obvious reproduction or devious forgery, the copy of a
"work of art" is generally understood to be less valuable than its
original.
This fact means that the nature of a "work of art" inheres in
something other than its material manifestation. Specifically, it
means that when one says that original works of art "can't be cop-
ied," one means that any copy, however exact or precise an imita-
tion, necesssarily omits some intangible but most valuable aspect of
its original. Benjamin called this unreproducible element "authen-
I I See text accompanying note 10.
12 The qualifier "most" is necessary because some visual artists will work in "multi-
ple originals." See Mclnerney quotation, supra note 9. Hereafter, this Note will use the
term "visual artists" without qualification, to designate those artists whose work consists
of one-of-a-kind, "original" objects.
13 WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in ILLuMi-
NATIONS 217, 218 (Harry Zohn trans. 1968). Benjamin goes on to distinguish between
manual reproduction and modem, technical means of reproduction. Manual reproduc-
tion reasserts the authenticity of the original, whereas technical reproduction breaks
down the myth of authenticity and divorces art from ritual. See id. at 224.
14 See ScoTr HODES, WHAT EVERY ARTIST AND COL.ECTOR SHOULD KNow ABoUT
THE LAw 116 (1974). Hodes observed: "Modem techniques often prevent the most
conscientious sculptor from controlling the production of casts in excess of an author-
ized edition. 'If you can make one, you can make a thousand,' said one expert, who
noted that a bronze can be reproduced to within one one-thousandth of an inch accu-
racy." Id
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ticity,"' 15 and asserted that authenticity depended on "[t]he pres-
ence of the original."' 16 "Authenticity," for Benjamin, could never
be copied. "The whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical-
and, of course, not only technical-reproducibility."' 17
Strictly speaking, the proposition that a copy of a "work of art"
is less valuable than its original is sometimes false. A forgery may
be a better painting, aesthetically, than the authentic original. As
Nelson Goodman observed, "a copy of a Lastman by Rembrandt
may well be better than the original."18 This point in turn elicits the
problem: given two physically identical paintings, the aesthetic dif-
ferences of which cannot be seen by anyone, does it make sense to
worry about which is "authentic" and which a "forgery"?' 9
To answer this concern, the approbative brand of "authentic-
ity" must be something other than a seal of aesthetic quality. Benja-
min explains:
Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in
one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence
at the place where it happens to be. This unique existence of the
work of art determined the history to which it was subject
throughout the time of its existence. This includes the changes
which it may have suffered in physical condition over the years as
well as the various changes in its ownership. The traces of the
first can be revealed only by chemical or physical analyses which it
is impossible to perform on a reproduction; changes of ownership
are subject to a tradition which must be traced from the situation
of the original.20
"Authenticity," which Benjamin has said is unreproducible from an
original, would therefore appear to be not an aesthetic quality, but a
tracing of a history and an assurance of a kind of pedigree.21 This
understood, it becomes even easier to explain why Rembrandt's for-
15 W. BENJAMIN, supra note 13, at 220.
16 Id.
17 Id. As indicated in supra note 13, Benjamin developed a distinction between
manual and technical reproduction. "Confronted with its manual reproduction, which
was usually branded as a forgery, the original preserved all its authority; not so vis a vis
technical reproduction." Id. Benjamin's thesis was that modem forms of art which ac-
commodate technical reproducibility (film in particular) dispense with the need for the
myth of authenticity.
18 Nelson Goodman, Art and Authenticity, in EsTHErcs CONTEMPORARY 132, 136
(Richard Kostelanetz ed. 1989).
19 Admittedly, the question may be rationally answered in the affirmative when the
work of art is considered not aesthetically, but as an investment commodity. Also, the
fact that one knows that one of two copies is historically authentic may bear on one's
future ability to discern differences between them. See infra text accompanying notes 32-
34.
20 W. BENJAMIN, supra note 13, at 220.
21 See also Goodman, supra note 18, at 132 ("We know from a fully documented
history that [a] painting.., is the original").
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gery of Lastman should be more valuable than the original: Rem-
brandt's Lastman may be not only aesthetically superior, but it may
actually be the more "authentic" painting, in that it is traceable to a
more desirable historical origin, the more valued painter,
Rembrandt.
b. The Pleadings of Buyers and Sellers
Case law illustrates that art buyers and art sellers implicitly ac-
cept Benjamin's theory of authenticity and place value in something
other than the physical qualities of the works of art they own. For
example, in the famous case of Weisz v. Parke Bernet Galleries, Inc.,22
the buyer of a "forgery" sued an auction house for breach of a war-
ranty of historical fact. The buyer purchased a painting which the
seller had identified as a work of Raoul Dufy. After a state agency
informed the buyer that the painting was counterfeit, the buyer
sued, alleging that the seller's identification of the painting consti-
tuted a warranty of the fact of Dufy's authorship. 28
Art dealers also appear sensitive about appraisals of works they
wish to sell. In one case, an art dealer sued the Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art, alleging detrimental reliance on a negligent appraisal
by one of the Museum's curators. 24 In purchasing a statue for the
purpose of reselling it, the dealer claimed to have acted on the cura-
tor's allegedly negligent statements as to a statue's authenticity and
value. In granting the Museum's motion for summary judgment,
the court found that the dealer had not demonstrated that the cura-
tor knew or could have known the dealer would act in reliance on
the curator's statements. 25 Moreover, the court found that no "spe-
cial relationship" creating a duty of care existed between the dealer
and the curator.26
Perhaps finding the theories of warranty under the common law
and general commercial statutes inadequate in the context of the art
market,27 New York and Michigan have passed art warranty stat-
22 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 77 Misc. 2d 80,
351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
23 Although its decision for the buyer was overturned on appeal, Weisz v. Parke-
Bernet Galleries, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 80, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1974), the finding of
the lower court in Weisz, that the stated history of a work may be a warranty of authentic-
ity, has precedent in the common law. See, e.g., Pennell v. Woodburn, 173 Eng. Rep. 52
(1835); De Sewhanberg v. Buchanan, 172 Eng. Rep. 1004 (1832); Lomi v. Tucker, 172
Eng. Rep. 586 (1829). For a discussion of these and related English cases, see Patty
Gerstenblith, Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art Market, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 501, 504-07 (1988).
24 Struna v. Wolf, 126 Misc. 2d 1031, 484 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
25 Id. at 1036-37, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97.
26 Id.
27 See Gerstenblith, supra note 23, at 511-14 (U.C.C. § 2-314's implied warranty of
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utes. 28 New York's law mandates that a written statement about a
work's authenticity creates an express warranty and becomes a pre-
sumptive part of the basis of the bargain.29 Furthermore, New York
sets clear standards for the validity of disclaimers of warranty.30 For
the purposes of this Note, however, it is incidental whether the law
will or will not enforce warranties of authenticity or recognize dis-
claimers. What is important is what art buyers and sellers plead,
and what that says about how they value works of art that they own.
Art collectors do not plead claims having to do with the aesthetic
merit of a purchased work. No one claims, for example, that his
painting is not as beautiful as the seller had promised. Likewise,
remedy-seeking buyers do not express disenchantment over misrep-
resentations that are literally material. No one complains, for exam-
ple, that the stitched canvas he actually bought was warranted to be
burlap.
c. The Pedagogical Function of the Theory of Authenticity
The plaintiffs in the above cases may or may not be aesthetically
naive or untutored.3 ' However, it may remain rational to cling to a
belief in the importance of authenticity, whether or not one can tell
the difference between the original and a forgery. Nelson Goodman
has pointed out that one's knowledge of a work's authenticity may
be instrumental in training one's aesthetic sensitivity. To explain
this point, Goodman first reasons that one cannot assume that one's
aesthetic sensitivity will remain as it was on a particular viewing
of two paintings.32 Second, Goodman notes that one need not idly
merchantability "is probably of limited application to the sale of art works," and U.G.C.
§ 2-315's warranty of fitness for a particular purpose "rarely applies to the sale of art
works because the particular purpose must be more than simply the desire to own a particular work by
a particular artist") (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
28 See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw §§ 13.01-.21 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1990);
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 442.311-.325 (West 1989).
29 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 13.01(1) (McKinney Supp. 1990). Cf. MICH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 442.322 (West 1989).
,30 N.Y. ARTs & CULT. AFF. LAw § 13.01(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990) ("[N]egation
or limitation [of warranty] shall be deemed unreasonable if: .. . not conspicuous," not
in writing, or in "[w]ords of general disclaimer"; or the work is proved counterfeit; "or
the information provided is proved to be... false, mistaken, or erroneous"). Michigan
has an almost identical law. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 442.323 (West 1989).
31 Of course, these plaintiffs may also have no pretensions about collecting art for
anything other than investment. Also, it remains possible that concern for economic
value might lie quite apart from an aesthetic concern.
32 Goodman, supra note 18, at 134:
Although I see no difference now between ... two pictures .... I
may learn to see a difference between them. I cannot determine now by
merely looking at them, or in any other way, that I shall be able to learn.
But the information that they are very different, that the one is the origi-
nal and the other the forgery, argues against any inference to the conclu-
sion that I shall not be able to learn ....
518 [Vol. 76:510
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hope that one's aesthetic faculties will improve magically or of their
own accord. Rather, Goodman argues that the act of viewing, com-
bined with the abstract knowledge that one of the two indistinguish-
able paintings is authentic, actively inculcates the ability to
distinguish between them:
[To look at the pictures now with the knowledge that the left one
is the original and the other the forgery may help develop the
ability to tell which is which later by merely looking at them.
Thus, with information not derived from the present or any past
looking at the pictures, the present looking may have quite differ-
ent bearing upon future lookings from what it would otherwise
have.33
Authenticity, then, may influence and shape one's aesthetic sensitiv-
ity. Goodman concludes, "[t]he way the pictures in fact differ con-
stitutes an aesthetic difference between them for me now, because
my knowledge of the way they differ bears upon the role of the pres-
ent looking in training my perceptions to discriminate between
these pictures, and between others."3 4
3. How the Theory of Authenticity Undermines the Common
Understanding
Ultimately, Benjamin and Goodman differ on what constitutes
the most important role or function of authenticity.35 When one
considers, however, the implications that the theory of authenticity
may have on the treatment of the visual arts in the Copyright Act,
Benjamin's and Goodman's articulations have the same effects. In
either philosopher's articulation, authenticity both: (a) legitimizes
the law's refusal to protect the work of visual artists through the
Copyright Act; and (b) suggests that the value of "original" works of
art lies not in their scarcity as commodities, but in some "aura" or
"demand" that the works impart to, or elicit from, an audience.
As discussed above, Benjamin maintains that authenticity can-
not be copied. If this is true, then the common justification for the
Id. (emphasis in original).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 For Benjamin, authenticity is an historically recent concept. As Benjamin ex-
plains, until the 19th century it made no sense to speak of the "authenticity" of a paint-
ing of the Madonna; prior to that the religious significance of the painting clearly
predominated. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 13, at 243 n.1. This recent concept functions as
a revisionary device, by which a secularized authority maintains a distance and a sense of
power. See id. at 222-23, 241, 253 n.5. For Goodman, authenticity may be valued for a
pedagogical rather than an ideological function. Although aesthetic evaluations may be
made in favor of acknowledged forgeries (see supra text accompanying note 18), the ac-
knowledged fact of forgery may in other instances help shape the aesthetic sense (see
supra text accompanying notes 32-34).
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Copyright Act's inapplicability is borne out. Copyright protection
would then properly be suited for those arts in which value inheres
in copies. Similarly, if Goodman is correct that knowledge of au-
thenticity remains instructive even where two paintings are visually
indistinguishable, then even reproducible paintings are necessarily
one-of-a-kind objects which cannot be copied. Again, the Copyright
Act could not properly be expected to protect the value of singular
originals.
For both Benjamin and Goodman, however, authenticity sepa-
rates the value of a work of art from the work of art itself as an
object. Authenticity can never be copied because, Benjamin contin-
ues, authenticity is a fact of history, a tracing of ajourney which can
be documented scientifically and legally. 6 Furthermore, as Benja-
min suggests, that journey began with what may be referred to as a
"performance." "[T]he unique value of the 'authentic' work of art
has its basis in ritual, the location of its original use value."'3 7 Good-
man stresses an interactive quality to this "performance"; the viewer
may use the information of authenticity, which Goodman more
nearly allows to be something other than an aesthetic quality,38 to
influence his own perception of future performances of the work of
art. In Goodman's emphasis, it is as if we insist on authenticity be-
cause we want it to teach us more than we know.
"One of a kind need not apply," therefore, in two senses. As
discussed earlier in section 1, the author of a one-of-a-kind art ob-
ject need not secure copyright protection for her work; to do so
would not benefit her in any way. As discussed in this section, how-
ever, the term "one of a kind" does not accurately apply to an origi-
nal work of art; its uniqueness as an object only begins its
performance as a "work of art." In other words, an authentic work
of art must be not "one of a kind" but "many of a kind," in that it
must elicit and then sustain a particular kind of attention over time.
Furthermore, if a work of art will remain authentic and therefore
valuable, the history of its performances must be traceable.
36 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
37 W. BENJAMIN, supra note 13, at 224.
38 Benjamin and Goodman would both have difficulty in allowing that a work of art
could reserve to itself an aesthetic realm that was not impinged by political and social
forces. For Benjamin, the fact that authenticity was not so much a feature of the object
as it was a feature of history did not necessarily allow the object itself to retain an inher-
ent (or immutable, or transcendent) quality; Benjamin would see the entire endeavor of
aestheticization in a decidedly political context. See idL at 241-42 (fascism aestheticizes
politics; communism responds by politicizing art). Goodman, for his part, presumes the
separateness of the aesthetic from the concern for authenticity, even while maintaining
that the latter develops the former. Note, however, that Goodman dismisses as "com-
mon nonsense" the proposition that a work of art should be approached without any
outside preconceptions. Goodman, supra note 18, at 137-38.
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B. Attenuations of "Copy"
The previous section demonstrated that works of visual art are
not necessarily one-of-a-kind original objects. Therefore, one
should not readily presume that copyright law cannot effectively
protect the visual arts.' This subpart demonstrates that the Copy-
right Act already promulgates a very broad conception of "copy,"
further indicating that works of visual art might be accommodated.
Moreover, this subpart develops the idea that an original work of
visual art might be best analogized, not with books and other forms
which are literally reproduced, but with musical or dramatic per-
formances. The subpart suggests that a work of art, in order to be
recognized as an authentic work of art, must necessarily be "copied"
by viewers; a work of art which never "performs" (or is never dis-
played) is not a work of art at all.
1. The "Copies" Already in the Copyright Act
Previous references to the Copyright Act may have implied that
the Act explicitly reserves its protection to literal copies of an origi-
nal. In fact, the Copyright Act explicitly protects many of the arts
which simply cannot be copied in a literal fashion.3 9 Originally con-
ceived to encourage "learning, by securing the copies of maps,
charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies," 40
copyright law has over the years expanded its scope,4 1 so that it now
protects musical performances in jUkeboxes, 42 dramatic perform-
ances,43 and choreography.44 Such protected performances, of
course, may be thought of as "copies," if only in a figurative sense.
Indeed, the scope of the Copyright Act has become so broad
that an event's amenability to the "copy" metaphor is no longer a
prerequisite for inclusion. Section 102 of the Act provides: "Copy-
right protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 45
"Copy," of course, remains a central term and theme in the Copy-
right Act. But even the Act's definition of "copy" is less restrictive
39 The Copyright Act also explicitly protects arts which can be copied in a literal
fashion, but cannot be copied in an authentic fashion; that is, the Copyright Act explic-
itly protects "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1988).
40 Copyrights Act, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
41 See generaUyJessica D. iUtman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 857 (1987) (history of amendments to copyright law).
42 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1988).
43 Id. § 102(a)(3).
44 Id. § 102(a)(4).
45 Id. § 102(a).
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than one might think: "The term 'copies' includes the material ob-
ject... in which the work is first fixed." 46
2. Viewing as Copying/Display as Performance
With the scope of the Copyright Act in mind, and understand-
ing that "copy" includes performances and even "the material ob-
ject..., in which the work is first fixed," 47 note how paintings and
sculptures are "copied" and "replayed" all of the time, and by more
than the obvious reproductions. These most obvious reproductions
really are not copies of paintings and sculptures at all, but are in-
stead postcards, prints, posters, photographs, and slides-objects
which may be copies of an original work of art, but are manifestly
not copies of the authentic and therefore valuable original they repre-
sent. The authentic original cannot be copied in postcards, prints,
posters, photographs, and slides.
However, it may be said that the authentic original, the singular
object itself, is "copied" in a less obvious respect. An authentic
work of art will likely withstand repeated exhibition, limited only by
the physical properties of constituent materials and the care of han-
dlers.48 We may say a viewer "copies" an authentic work of art
when he views it, and that the viewer will leave the work with an
"impression" of it. This hypothetical viewer might not only recog-
nize the work should he see it again, but might also later "refer" to
it in memory.49 Admittedly, authenticity cannot be transferred in
46 Id. § 101; see also infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
47 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
48 Cf. EDMUND SPENSER, THE FAERIE QUEENE, Mutabilitie, Canto VII (Thomas Roche,
Jr. ed. 1981):
When these were past, thus gan the Titanesse;
Lo, mighty mother, now be iudge and say,
Whether in all thy creatures more or lesse
CHANGE doth not raign & beare the greatest sway:
For, who sees not, that Time on all doth pray?
But Times do change and moue continually.
So nothing here long standeth in one stay:
Wherefore, this lower world who can deny
But to be subiect still to Mutabilitie?
Id at 1051.
49 Cf JACQUES DERRIDA, THE TRUTH IN PAINTING (Geoff Bennington & Ian McLeod
trans. 1987):
And then, if I must simplify shamelessly, it is as if there had been, for me,
two paintings in painting. One, taking the breath away, a stranger to all
discourse, doomed to the presumed mutism of 'the-thing-itself,' restores,
in authoritarian silence, an order of presence. It motivates or deploys,
then, while totally denying it, a poem or philosopheme whose code seems
to me to be exhausted. The other, therefore the same, voluble, inex-
haustible, reproduces virtually an old language, belated with respect to
the thrusting point of a text which interests me.
Id. at 155-56.
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this kind of "copy" either. But in another sense, the very authentic-
ity of the work depends on the fact of being "copied" or viewed. In
Goodman's emphasis, "authenticity" is that which helps a viewer
discriminate more precisely as a viewer; in Benjamin's emphasis, au-
thenticity as perpetration requires one on whom a perpetration may
be made.50
One may state in another way the dependence of an object's
status as a "work of art" on the fact of an appreciable audience.
Benjamin would say that a work of art, never exhibited, would not
yet actually be a "work of art" at all, although it might return to the
status of a cult icon. Benjamin writes:
Certain statues of gods are accessible only to the priest in the
cella; certain Madonnas remain covered nearly all year round; cer-
tain sculptures on medieval cathedrals are invisible to the specta-
tor on ground level. With the emancipation of the various art
practices from ritual go increasing opportunities for the exhibi-
tion of their products. It is easier to exhibit a portrait bust that
can be sent here and there than to exhibit the statue of a divinity
that has its fixed place in the interior of a temple. The same holds
for the painting as against the mosaic or fresco that preceded it.
And even though the public presentability of a mass originally
may have been just as great as that of a symphony, the latter
originated at the moment when its public presentability promised
to surpass that of the mass. 51
Therefore, following Benjamin, one might say that the "work of art"
not only represents a secularization of cult ritual, but that when we
recognize an object as a "work of art" we also say something about
that object's status with a "secularized" audience, an audience
larger and accustomed to greater access than audiences for whom
the same object might have cult status.
This audience, however "secularized," nevertheless demands
that the authentic work of art "perform." Edward C. Banfield once
asked whether museums should not exhibit reproductions rather
than original works of art, in order to reduce the costs of security
and conservation.52 John Henry Merryman and Albert E. Elsen, as-
sessing the public desire for authenticity, summarized Banfield's po-
sition and responded as follows:
Banfield sees reactions such as ours [against the legal making of
exact reproductions of sculptures] as symptomatic of the art
world's desire, through a cult of the original and the economics of
50 In other words, both philosophers restate the conundrum of the falling tree in
the depopulated forest.
51 W. BENJAMIN, supra note 13, at 225.
52 Edward C. Banfield, Art Versus Collectibles: Why Museums Should Be Filled with Fakes,
HARPER'S, Aug. 1982, at 29-30.
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scarcity, to keep art prices high. He wants to see "mass duplica-
tion of masterpieces ... at per unit prices within the reach not
only of schools and libraries, but of average-income individuals."
Banfield seems unaware that there have long been museums of
copies in Paris, London, and Rome and that they are empty of
visitors.53
Merryman and Elsen concluded that "people value the actual work
of art over any reproduction, just as they value truth and not its
facsimile."M
C. The Royalty Almost in Place
Appreciating the breadth of scope of the Copyright Act, and
understanding that the nature of an original work of visual art is
more akin to a performance than it is to any other kind of "copy,"
one may better comprehend that the current Copyright Act already
circumvents the traditional notion of copyright inapplicability to the
visual arts, insofar as it defines an exclusive right to public display of
works of visual art. This right to public display is impeded, how-
ever, by another section in the Act which provides that the public
display right-unlike the other exclusive rights provided to the
copyright holder by the Act-does not survive transfers of owner-
ship. To a lesser degree, current copyright notice procedures also
impede effective functioning of the public display right.
1. The Section 106(5) Public Display Right
Reminded that copyright law protects musical performances,
dramatic performances, and even choreography 55 ("copies" in a
metaphorical sense), one is perhaps less surprised to discover that
the Copyright Act also protects the public display of an original ob-
ject. Section 106(5) dictates that a copyright owner has exclusive
rights "to display. . . publicly" or "to authorize" public display of
"pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works." 56 This right, left unquali-
fied, would give the visual artist control over the public57 display of
her work, whether or not she remained the owner of her work.58
But another section of the Copyright Act definitively qualifies this
right.
53 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, 2 LAw, ETHics, AND THE VISUAL
ARTS 548 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting Banfield, supra note 52, at 29-30).
54 Id.
55 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
56 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1988).
57 The qualifier, "public," should be emphasized. A right to public display would
not include, for example, the right to control day-to-day display in an owner's private
living room. See infra text accompanying note 145.
58 See infra text accompanying notes 64-68.
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2. Impediments to the Section 106(5) Public Display Right
a. The Section 109(c) Limitation and the System It Unravels
The rights enumerated in section 106(5), including the artist's
exclusive right to public display, are subject to sections 107 through
118.59 Section 109(c) reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a
particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any person au-
thorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or
by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers
present at the place where the copy is located. 6°
The legislative history indicates that Congress wished "to preserve
the traditional privilege of the owner of a copy to display it di-
rectly," and to place only "reasonable restrictions" on the owner's
privilege when "the copyright owner's market for reproduction and
distribution of copies would be affected." 6' Congress saw the need
for restrictions on the "traditional privilege" in order to protect
"new communications media, notably television, cable, and optical
transmission devices, and information storage and retrieval devices,
[which replace] printed copies with visual images. '62 The general
principle that section 109(c) observes, however, according to the
House Report, is that "the lawful owner of a copy of a work should
be able to put his copy on public display without the consent of the
copyright owner."16 3
As Congress evidently understood, were it not for the express
limitation of section 109(c), the artist's public display right would as
59 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
60 Id § 109(c).
61 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5694. Only ownership would suspend the 106(5) display right;
"acquisition of an object embodying a copyrighted work by rental, lease, loan, or bail-
ment carries with it no privilege... to display it publicly .... Id. at 80, 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5694.
62 Id. To distinguish the new communications media (which it wished to protect)
from the owner's traditional display privilege (which it wished to preserve), Congress
conceived of distinctions between "direct" and "indirect" display. "Direct" displays are
authorized, even without the copyright owner's permission. "Indirect" displays are not
authorized without the copyright owner's permission (unless those indirect displays in-
volve "projection of no more than one image at a time," to viewers "present at the place
where the copy is located"; i.e., unless the indirect display seems more like a direct dis-
play and yet not the display of a motion picture). Id. at 80, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5693-94.
The effect of these distinctions is to allow owners to display works of art (or slides
or transparencies) without permission, but to prohibit owners from publicly "display-
ing" motion pictures or computer programs.
63 Id. at 79, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5693. Note that section
109(c) was then designated section 109(b); the redesignation was made by the Record
Rental Amendment of 1984. PUB. L. No. 98-450, § 2(l), 98 Stat. 1727 (1986).
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a matter of course continue in her work, even after transfer of own-
ership. To thoroughly ground this reading, one need follow a few
turns in other sections of the Act. Copyright "vests initially in the
author or authors of the work." 64 Moreover, "[t]ransfer of owner-
ship of any material object ... does not of itself convey any rights in
the copyrighted work embodied in the object." 65 An unqualified
section 106(5) exclusive right of public display, therefore, would re-
main with the artist whether or not the work were sold; a secondary
owner would not have the right to display the painting unless the
"author" of the painting expressly assigned that right.
An objection may be raised to this reading. Citing the defini-
tion section, one might argue that "display" does not anticipate the
showing of an original work of art. "To 'display' a work means to
show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, televi-
sion image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images
nonsequentially." 66 But this argument fails. The definition section
also provides that "It]he term 'copies' includes the material object
... in which the work is first fixed." 67 Moreover, the legislative his-
tory of section 106 supports the inclusion of the original within the
meaning of "copies" meant to be protected:
The corresponding definition of "display" covers any showing of
a "copy" of the work, "either directly or by means of a film, slide,
television image, or any other device or process." Since "copies"
are defined as including the material object "in which the work is
first fixed," the right of public display applies to original works of
art as well as to reproductions of them.68
In short, Congress understood the implications of section 106(5),
that it could grant artists an exclusive right of public display that
could survive transfer, and would do so but for section 109(c).
An unqualified section 106(5) right would be powerful: artists
64 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
65 Id. § 202. The House Report reinforces the point as follows:
The principle restated in section 202 is a fundamental and important
one: that copyright ownership and ownership of a material object in
which the copyrighted work is embodied are entirely separate things.
Thus, transfer of a material object does not of itself carry any rights
under the copyright, and this includes transfer of the copy or pho-
norecord-the original manuscript, the photographic negative, the unique
painting or statue, the master tape recording, etc.-in which the work was
first fixed.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5739-40 (emphasis added).
66 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
67 Id.
68 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5677.
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would then have the means by which to negotiate royalties. If, for
instance, a purchaser of a work wanted the right to publicly display
that work, he would have to either purchase the artist's entire copy-
right69 or license the public display right from her. Given section
109(c), however, the public display right presently only applies
when the artist remains the owner of her work. In other words, sec-
tion 109(c) leaves the artist with no more of a public display right
than that presumed to reside with any other owner. Section 109(c),
therefore, denies the visual artist the bargaining position from
which she might exact royalties.
b. The Current Notice Procedure
Were section 109(c) repealed, current notice procedures of
the Copyright Act, as construed by the Copyright Office, might
present unnecessary inconveniences to the effective use of the pub-
lic display right.70 Section 401 states that notice shall consist of
three elements: (1) the word "copyright" or an abbreviation, or the
copyright symbol of a "c" within a circle; (2) the year of first publica-
tion;71 and (3) the name of the copyright owner. 72 The section re-
quires the notice be affixed so "as to give reasonable notice of the
claim of copyright," and directs the Register of Copyrights to "pre-
scribe by regulation, as examples," methods and positions to satisfy
69 That is, the buyer who wished to display the work might purchase the artist's
whole bundle of exclusive rights, which would include the section 113 right of reproduc-
tion, see supra text accompanying note 7, as well as the section 106(5) public display
right.
70 The reader should understand that, strictly speaking, copyright notice is no
longer a prerequisite to secure a valid copyright. This change, from the traditional no-
tice requirement, is in compliance with the Berne Convention, which the United States has
adopted as of 1988. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
568, 102 Stat. 2855 (1988); see 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1988). However, as a practical matter,
copyright holders should continue to follow the notice provisions of the Act, in order to
secure certain enforcement advantages. These advantages include general preclusion of
the defense of innocent infringement in a copyright infringement suit. Id. § 401(d).
Again in compliance with the Berne Convention, the Copyright Act no longer re-
quires registration. As with the notice procedure, however, advantages accrue to the
copyright owner who registers. For works originating in the United States, registration
is necessary in order to bring an action for infringement of the copyright. Id § 411 (a).
Moreover, one who registers will insure her entitlement to statutory damages and attor-
ney fees. Id. § 412. Copyright registration is not discussed in the text because the pro-
cedure presents no undue imposition on the visual artist. In fact, the Copyright Office
promulgates a special registration form for the visual arts (Form VA, available from the
Copyright Office upon request, see 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(2) (1990); this form is conve-
niently reprinted in WiLL4m R. GIGNILLIAT, III, CoNTRAcTS FOR ARnsTS 172-77
(1983)).
71 "Publication" is distribution of a work to the public by transfer of ownership or
by lease, and includes the offer to distribute the work to a group for the purpose of
further distribution or public display. Display (to show a copy or the original, directly or
indirectly) does not of itself constitute publication. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
72 Id § 401(b).
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the requirement. 73
Such regulations have been prescribed. For two-dimensional
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, the notice may be "affixed
directly or by means of a label cemented, sewn, or otherwise at-
tached durably . . . [on] the front or back . . . or to any backing,
mounting, matting, framing, or other material . . . durably at-
tached."74 For three-dimensional pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works, notice may be affixed by the same means "to any visible por-
tion of the work, or to any base, mounting, framing, or other mate-
rial . . . durably attached."' 75 If these methods are extremely
impracticable, "a notice is acceptable if it appears on a tag... that is
attached... [so] that it will remain with the copy while it is passing
through its normal channels of commerce."' 76
Although allowing affixation of notice on the back of two-
dimensional works, the current regulations may not fully accommo-
date prevalent artistic convention. Some artists may resist the line
the regulations implicitly draw between the pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural work itself and the mundane or functional accoutrements
of the work's display. For example, in the case of three-dimensional
works, a sculptor might resist distinguishing a "base" or "mount-
ing" from the object meant to be viewed and contemplated as the
work of art. In such cases, the artist would not be able to comply
with the methods of notice sanctioned by regulation. 77
Failure to satisfy the approved regulatory methods does not
necessarily mean that the notice provision of section 401 has not
been met: the statute states that "these [regulatory] specifications
shall not be considered exhaustive."' 78 Appropriate and carefully
considered regulatory notice procedures, however, would better
73 Id. § 401 (c).
74 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(i)(1) (1990).
75 Id. § 201.20(i)(2).
76 Id § 201.20(i)(3).
77 Furthermore, the regulations seem designed to set notice standards for commer-
cial reproductions. Each of the previously referenced sub-subsections, supra notes 74-
76, begins with some variation of the phrase, "where a work is reproduced in copia" (em-
phasis added). The word "reproduced" implies that the subsequent approved methods
have been drawn primarily for purposes of commercial reproductions, and only secon-
darily for singular pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works. It should be remembered,
however, that the Copyright Act defines "copies" to include the original object in which
the work is first fixed. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The word "reproduced" should not be
taken to preclude application of the approved methods to singular pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1990) ("The registrability of [a picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural work] is not affected by the intention of the author as to the
use of the work or the number of copies reproduced.").
78 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1988). The House Report to the 1976 amendments states:
A notice placed or affixed in accordance with the regulations would
clearly meet the requirements but, since the Register's specifications are
not to "be considered exhaustive," a notice placed or affixed in some
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support and protect an effective display right. Fully admitting the
value of the notice provision and the functions it serves,79 its pur-
poses might well be satisfied in any number of ways not now con-
templated by the regulations. In the context of exhibition, for
example, the three required section 401 elements might be placed:
within any caption alongside a work (in exhibition contexts, captions
are already widely used to identify artists, materials, dimensions,
and years of completion); within a general notice affixed to a sign
titling the exhibition or announcing the exhibition's theme; or
within a printed flier or guide distributed freely and as a matter
of course upon admission to the exhibition. However reasonable
such notice procedures seem, an artist might rely with more confi-
dence on them were they explicitly delineated and sanctioned by
regulation."s
PART II: ALTERNATIVE ROYALTY EVENTS
Part I of this Note demonstrated that copyright protection is
not nearly as inapplicable to the visual arts as has been assumed. As
Part I argued, the Copyright Act itself contemplates rights that
might provide visual artists with a basis for royalty rights. Once mis-
conceptions have been rectified and a royalty for visual artists seems
tenable, the particular form that a royalty might take becomes signif-
other way might also comply with the law if it were found to "give reason-
able notice" of the copyright claim.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 144, eprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5760.
79 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5759 (copyright notice serves four principal functions: it
places in the public domain published material that no one wishes to copyright; it in-
forms the public as to whether a work is copyrighted; it identifies the copyright owner,
and it shows the publication date).
80 A bill introduced by Senator Kennedy and Representative Markey, The Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1987, would have solved the difficulties of the notice procedure by
making section 401 inapplicable to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works. S. 1619,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 133 CONG. REc. S11,502 (1987); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5, 133 CONG. REC. E3425 (1987). A later version of this bill does not explicitly
address the notice procedures of section 401; however, major provisions of the later bill
would apply only to works of "recognized stature," and it may be assumed that some
equivalent of notice has been served if the works exempted have attained such status.
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 135 CONG.
REc. S6811-13 (1989); H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 135 CONG. REc. E2199-
2201 (1989).
The approaches the Kennedy and Markey bills (in either version) take to the notice
question can be reconciled with the policy of encouraging notice on the assumption that
the public should presume that works of fine art as such are original and creative and not
presumptively in the public domain. Some commentators would endorse this assump-
tion. See, e.g., Donald M. Millinger, Copyright and the Fine Artist, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
354, 374 (1980) (the copyright symbol is not needed in the case of the fine arts "because
the mere physical existence of the piece should indicate copyright protection").
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icant. This part examines alternative models: first, the droit de suite,
the model on which all prior proposals for a visual artists' royalty
have been based; and second, the "exhibition royalty," a model dis-
cerned here for the first time from a right already enunciated in the
Copyright Act. The part concludes that the latter model is to be
preferred.
A. Moral Resales
This subpart first outlines the history of proposals for a visual
artists' royalty in the United States. The subpart then argues that all
of these proposals, and the French model on which they are all
based, presume inaccurately what visual artists need and what they
desire. The subpart also suggests that proponents of a visual artists'
royalty, to date, have all further presumed that conventional copy-
right structures cannot be applied to the visual arts.8
1. The Droit de Suite in America
As shown in Part I, the current Copyright Act already conceptu-
alizes a right on which royalties for visual artists might be based.
Another paradigm for such a royalty may be found outside the Act.
This is the droit de suite, a French law for the benefit of painters and
sculptors.8 2 It provides, in part, that "[a]uthors of graphic and
plastic works shall have, regardless of transfer of the original work,
an inalienable right to participate in the proceeds of any sale of their
works by public auction or through a dealer."'8 3 The droit de suite is
companion to the droit moral,s4 moral rights guaranteeing an artist
the rights of divulgation, paternity, and integrity.8 5 At least since
81 Part I demonstrated that this presumption is erroneous.
82 France, Law of March 11, 1957, tit. 2, art. 42, C. civ. art. 543 (D.L. 1988). The
particular provision defining the droit de suite is translated in J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN,
supra note 53, at 213.
83 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 53, at 213.
84 France, Law of March 11, 1957, tit. 1, C. civ. art. 543 (D.L. 1988). Selected sec-
tions of the droit moral are translated in GEORGE A. BERMAN, HENRY P. DE VRIES & NINA
GALSTON, FRENCH LAW: CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION 4-38 (1989).
85 See Jane Engdahl, Moral Rights in State Statutes: A Comparison of the California Art
Preservation Act and the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act, 34 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 203, 208 (1987). Engdahl explained:
The right of divulgation is the right of an artist to decide whether his
work of art is finished and whether or not to display it in public. Paternity
is the right of an artist to have his name associated with his work. The
right of integrity is the artist's right to prevent distortion or other altera-
tion of his work.
Id. The droit moral are perhaps more familiar to Americans than the droit de suite, as at
least nine states now have statutes to recognize one or more of these moral rights. See
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987, 989 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); 1988 Conn. Acts 284 (Reg.
Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2151-:2156 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27,
§ 303 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.
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the 1960s, commentators have urged American adoption of the droit
de SUite. 8 6 In 1966, Diane Schulder offered a model "Art Proceeds
Act" which proposed in part: "Whenever an original work of art
shall be re-transferred at auction (or through a dealer) for a price of
300 dollars or above, the creator of the work ... shall have an ina-
lienable (non-transferable) right to a share in the gross proceeds of
the sale." 87 Following the droit de suite, Schulder proposed fixing the
artist's share in the proceeds at three percent.8
Apparently due in part to Schulder's proposal,8 9 the State of
California passed the Resale Royalties Act, effective January 1,
1977.90 This law provides that "[w]henever a work of fine art is sold
and the seller resides in California or the sale takes place in Califor-
nia .... the seller ... shall pay to the artist of such work of fine art
... 5 percent of the amount of such sale." 91 True to its French
precedent, the right is tenacious: "The right of the artist to receive
an amount equal to 5 percent of the amount of ... sale may be
waived only by a contract in writing providing for an amount in ex-
cess of 5 percent of the amount of such sale." 92 The Act has been
§§ 2A:24A-1 to 2A:24A-8 (West 1987); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAwv §§ 14.01-.03 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-1 to 5-62-6 (1987). For discussion of these statutes, see ThomasJ.
Davis, Jr., Fine Art and Moral Rights: The Immoral Triumph of Emotionalism, 17 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 317 (1989); Note, Protection ofArt Work Through Artist's Rights: An Analysis of State Law
and Proposal for Change, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 855 (1989) (authored by Karen M. Corr).
The moral rights bill pending in the 101st Congress would expressly preempt the
above state statutes to the extent that they grant rights equivalent to those of the federal
bill. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 135
CONG. REc. S6811, 6812 (1989); H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 135 CONG. REc.
E2199, 2200-01 (1989).
86 See Rita E. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Under-
privileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMp. (ASCAP) 1 (1962); Fran-
cois Hepp, Royalties From Works of the Fine Arts: Origin of the Concept of Droit de Suite in
Copyright Law, 6 BuLL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 91 (1959); Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A
Study of Droit de Suite and a Proposed Enactment for the United States, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 19
(1966).
87 Schulder, supra note 86, at 44. Although an inalienable royalty was unprece-
dented in common-lawjurisdictions, seeJ. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 53, at 213,
it should be remembered that Schulder (and other early droit de suite proponents) would
have found less in American copyright law of the time to suggest an alternative structure
for a visual artists' royalty; the display right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) is a product of the
1976 amendments to the Copyright Act (Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546 (Oct. 19,
1976)).
88 Schulder, supra note 86, at 44. The droite de suite provision is found in France,
Law of March 11, 1957, tit. 2, art. 42, C. civ. art. 543 (D.L. 1988).
89 See STEPHEN E. WEIL, BEAuTY AND THE BEASTS 211 (1983) (Schulder's Art Pro-
ceeds Act was "one of the seminal documents [in the] ... campaign for resale
royalties").
90 1976 Cal. Stat. 5542 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1990)).
91 Id.
92 Id.
amended9 s so that the right may now be assigned. The statute re-
quires, however, that "assignment shall not have the effect of creat-
ing a waiver .... "9
The California Act has been controversial. 95 The little evidence
available indicates that the Act is ineffective and practically unen-
forceable. 96 "The law has . . been generally ignored, or as one
dealer is reported to have said, '[n]obody's paid, nobody's sued,
everybody's avoiding it.' ,,97 Although the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has upheld the California Act against a federal pre-
emption challenge, 98 some question the California Act's continuing
validity after the 1976 amendments to the federal Copyright Act.9
Nevertheless, the California Act remains in effect.
The most recent proposal inspired by the droit de suite is the Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act of 1987, introduced by Senator Kennedy and
by Representative Markey in the 100th Congress.100 This bill would
have amended the Copyright Act to provide fights modeled after
both the droit moral and the droit de suite. The "moral rights" recog-
nized by the bill are rights of paternity'0 1 and integrity.' 0 2 The re-
93 1982 Cal. Star. 6432.
94 CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). The statute is admittedly am-
biguous; it is not clear what assignments would have "the effect of a creating a [prohib-
ited] waiver." Nimmer submits that "[i]f the waiver limitation is to be meaningful .... an
assignment of the artist's royalty rights to either the buyer or the seller, or to any entity
which either controls, should be held invalid." M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 9, at
§ 8.22[A][61.
95 See, e.g., Stephen S. Ashley, Critical Comment on CaUfornia's Droit de Suite, Civil
Code Section 986, 29 HAS-TINGS LJ. 249, 256 (1977) (criticizing the California Act).
96 See S. WEIL, supra note 89, at 210-22 (nobody benefits from the California Resale
Royalty Act).
97 McInerney, supra note 9, at 13.
98 Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.) (California Resale Royalties Act
does not violate the preemption provision of federal copyright law), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
983 (1980).
99 Compare Note, Droit De Suite: Only Congress Can Grant Royalty Protectionfor Artists,
9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 111 (1981) (authored by Lynn K. Warren) (arguing that amend-
ments to the Copyright Act since the Morseburg decision render the California statute
invalid) with Note, The California Resale Royalties Act As a Test Case for Preemption Under the
1976 Copyright Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1315 (1981) (authored byjennifer R. Clarke) (no
preemption under the amended Copyright Act).
100 S. 1619, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S11,502 (1987); H.R. 3221,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. E3425 (1987) (these bills are identical). Senator
Kennedy introduced essentially the same bill in the 99th Congress. S. 2796, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S12,184 (1986).
101 S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 100, § 3:
[The artist] shall have the right during his life to claim authorship of any
of his works which are publicly displayed or to disclaim authorship of any
of his works which are publicly displayed because of any distortion, muti-
lation, or other alteration thereof.
102 Id. §§ 3-4. With qualified exceptions for those works permanently attached to a
building, Kennedy's bill defines as a violation of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner the "significant or substantial distortion, mutilation, or other alteration to a picto-
L v '* - . , - w.
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sale royalty portion of the bill mandates a royalty of "7 percent of
the difference between the seller's purchase price and the amount
the seller receives in exchange for the work." 103 Again true to the
droit de suite, the 1987 bill makes the proceed right inalienable: "The
right of the author to receive this royalty may not be waived."' 0 4
A droit de suite-modeled royalty is not currently before the
Congress. Senator Kennedy and Representative Markey' 0 5 have in-
troduced the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989 into the 101st Con-
gress, 10 6 but unlike its predecessor, this bill does not include a
resale royalty provision. 107 Instead, the bill proposes to direct the
Register of Copyrights, in consultation with the Chair of the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts, to conduct a study on the feasibility
of the resale royalty, and to report to Congress with recommenda-
tions.108 Representative Kastenmeier has stated that the proposed
study would also consider the possibility of a waiver provision.10 9
2. Presumptions of the Droit de Suite
Although the droit de suite and the droit moral are conflated in
both French law and in federal proposals, the first American propo-
nents of the droit de suite insisted that the proceeds right is not strictly
a moral right but an economic one. 110 Rita Hauser wrote, "[ilt is an
economic interest that the droit de suite ensures, and not a moral one
.... The fact that the [droit de suite] . . . is inalienable does not
rial, graphic, or sculptural work, which is publicly displayed, caused by an intentional act
or by gross negligence .... " Id. § 3. Furthermore, the integrity right is effectively
inalienable. "Where the author is not the copyright owner, he shall still have the exclu-
sive right during his lifetime, and the estate of such author have the exclusive right for
up to 50 years after the death of such author, to assert infringement of the copyright [by
distortion, mutilation, or other alteration]." Id. § 3.
103 Id § 3.
104 Id.
105 Along with Senator Kasten and Representative Kastenmeier, respectively. 135
CONG. REc. S6811 (1989); 135 CONG. REC. E2199 (1989).
106 S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S6811 (1989); H.R. 2690, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E2199 (1989). H.R. 2690 passed the House onJune 5,
1990. Highlights, 40 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA), No. 984, at 127 (June 7,
1990). S. 1198 was approved by the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks onJune 28, 1990. News & Comment: Legislation, 40 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPY-
RiGHTJ. (BNA), No. 988, at 225 (July 12, 1990).
107 This bill essentially retains the moral rights proposals of Kennedy and Markey's
previous bill, see supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text, and expressly calls for fed-
eral preemption of equivalent state moral rights law. See supra note 80.
108 S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 106, § 9.
109 135 CONG. REC. E2199 (1989).
110 More recent commentary advocating the droit de suite has acknowledged the droit
de suite's dependence on the droit moral. See, e.g., Thomas M. Goetzl & Stuart A. Sutton,
Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display Right: A New Doctrinal Analysis, 9 ART & L. 15, 19
(1984) (the droit de suite functions as an adjunct to artists' broader moral rights).
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detract from its pecuniary quality .... "I II Equally plain, however,
is the converse: the fact that the droit de suite addresses a perceived
economic need does not mitigate its moral demand.' 12 For the droit
de suite not only seeks to give the artist an economic right, but seeks
to give an economic right in such a way that the artist may not re-
fuse. The droit de suite, in short, presumes to know what is best for
the artist, and insists that the artist accept its remedy in the form it
prescribes.
a. The Artistic Economy
Several commentators have already argued that the California
Resale Royalties Act will financially hurt the very artist it seeks to
help, because it will both divert resources to the already wealthy art-
ist" 3 and make the inevitably efficient art collector discount the ini-
tial price he would pay for a work. 14  In addition to these
weaknesses, there is a presumption informing the droit de suite that
needs to be challenged. The droit de suite, in insisting that artists
receive the coin of the realm, presumes that visual artists always op-
erate within a commodity market. Many artistic economies, how-
ever, are predicated on an altogether different system of exchange.
As Lewis Hyde points out, scientific and literary communities
often exchange works and ideas as "gifts." 115 "Scientists," for ex-
ample, "who give their ideas to the community receive recognition
and status in return." 116 In fact, in the context of these "gift" cen-
1il Hauser, supra note 86, at 16 (footnote omitted); see also Schulder, supra note 86, at
22 ("Though like the moral right in that it is inalienable, the droit de suite is more dosely
allied with the reproduction right, in that it is a 'pecuniary' right and is part of the au-
thor's copyright.") (footnote omitted).
Earlier proponents may have believed such a separation to be strategic. This may
no longer be the case; many states have now passed laws to protect the moral rights of
artists. See supra note 85.
112 See generally Neil F. Siegel, The Resale Royalty Provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act:
Their History and Theory, 93 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1988).
1S See, e.g., Ralph F. Colin, Statement on Behalf of the Art Dealers Association of America on
the Subject of Artists Sharing in Profits of Resale, reprinted in FRANKLIN FELDMAN, STEPHEN E.
WEIL & SusAN DuKE BIEDERMAN, I ART LAw 588, 589-90 (1986) (only a few, relatively
successful artists will have a resale market from which to derive resale proceeds). But see
Note, A Proposal for National Uniform Art-Proceeds Legislation, 53 IND. LJ. 129, 133 (1977)
(authored by Ann Louise Straw) ("If a piece is never resold no one profits from the
artist's original creativity; if the piece is resold, art-proceeds legislation justly reimburses
the artist for the economic exploitation of his original creativity . ) (foomote
omitted).
114 Ben W. Bolch, William W. Damon & C. Elton Hinshaw, An Economic Analysis of the
California Art Royalty Statute, 10 CONN. L. REV. 689, 690-93 (1978); cf. Tom R. Camp, Art
Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: An Empirical Study, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 146,
158-59 (1980) (the resale right would have a deleterious effect with respect to those
purchasers for whom price is an important factor).
115 LEwis HYDE, THE GiFr 74-92 (1983).
116 Id. at 77.
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tered communities, the exchange of work for money defines the
work as somehow less worthy or less important.' 17 The droit de suite
does not comprehend such non-monetary economies. Of course, if
a work of art never entered the kind of commercial market the droit
de suite controls, the droit de suite would present no problem. But
once a work of art is sold or otherwise enters the commercial mar-
ket, the inalienable droit de suite would insist that the work remain
there. The droit de suite could not in principle allow that work to
return to any noncommercial economy.' 18
Not that all artists will choose between "selling out" or living
for the praise of peers." 9 Commercial interjection may be neces-
sary to the proper dissemination of art work; commercialization may
also be thought of as a process of purification, through which an
artistic work emerges transcendant. 120 Furthermore, an artist may
117 Referring to the work of the sociologist Warren Hagstrom, Hyde explains and
illustrates:
[T]here is little recognition to be earned from writing a textbook for
money. As one of the scientists in Hagstrom's study puts it, if someone
"has written nothing at all but texts, they will have a null value or even a
negative value." Because such work brings no group reward, it makes
sense that it would earn a different sort of remuneration, cash. "Unlike
recognition, cash can be used outside the community of pure science,"
Hagstrom points out. Cash is a medium of foreign exchange, as it were,
because unlike a gift (and unlike status) it does not lose its value when it
moves beyond the boundary of the community. By the same token, as
Hagstrom comments elsewhere, "one reason why the publication of texts
tends to be a despised form of scientific communication [is that] the text-
book author appropriates community property for his personal profit."
Id. (emphasis in original).
118 This is particularly true of the Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1987. That
bill at section 3(d)(1) called for the evaluation of fair market values of property received
in exchange for a work of art. S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 100.
119 Still others will choose to remain "communities" unto their individual selves.
John Russell notes that the sculptor Brancusi "would as soon keep his work as sell it;
pieces like the 90-inch-high Caryatid stood around in his studio, unremarked and unre-
corded, for 40 years .... he was the epitome of anti-careerism." JOHN RUSSELL, THE
MEANINGS OF MODERN ART 259 (1981). This description of the artist who serves as his
own audience is perhaps as romantic as the description which underlies the droit de suite;
but it is an alternative description, calling into question the sufficiency of the droit de
suite's presumptions about an artist's needs.
120 Cf Milton Glasser, I Listen to the Market, in ON SIGNS 467, 473-74 (Marshall Blon-
sky ed. 1985):
There has to be some mitigating circumstance, or a series of events that
make... [high art] accessible .... And part of the whole vulgarization-
I use vulgarization in its best sense-is a process which comes through
exploitation, through social manipulation, through replication, through
counterfeit, through copying, and the breakdown of values that occurs as
problematical works are attacked. And eventually, the best thing that can
happen is that the original work (and its integrity) emerges unscathed by
reasserting its value in some way, after you have seen all the counterfeits
and vulgarizations.
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engage the commercial economy with but only the most ulterior res-
ervation. The poet A.R. Ammons explained this strategy as follows:
Nonimpositional liveliness comes from the so-called negative
emotions. Societies in which the members are allowed to devise
systems answering to greed, competition, fury, repression, ego-
tism are generally fully energized. The agencies of money answer
and enable the tendencies of "negative" feelings so as to provide
transformative possibilities potentially and usually strengthening
to the whole society, some imbalance and exploitation unavoida-
ble, of course, but correctable .... These negative situations,
truly and appropriately represented, alert our sympathies for and
knowledge of misfortune and terrible isolation so that we can act
individually toward real situations and real people, where the
rhetoric of altruism is nearly mindless automatism. 12 1
This fiercely stated acceptance of the principles of a competitive
commercial market throws the droit de suite into a different relief than
do the examples Hyde and Hagstrom provide. Not only may the
droit de suite be comprehending the wrong economy; it may also be
presuming the wrong problem in the economy it comprehends. An
artist who willingly enters the commercial marketplace may not hap-
pily abide the protection of an inalienable economic right. 122
b. The Droit de Suite's Necessary Stereotype of the Artist
The simplest way to rid the droit de suite of its presumption and
condescension is to eliminate its feature of inalienability. After all,
copyrights are normally waivable or assignable. 123 Somewhat curi-
ously, however, the proponents of a resale royalty have assumed
that a waivable resale royalty is not useful.' 24 Schulder reasoned,
"[i]f the artist is in a poor bargaining position initially vis-A-vis sale
of the canvas, presumably he will be in an equally poor position as
regards payment of a lump sum for assignment of future interests.
The right cannot be transferred and therefore cannot be attached by
creditors."' 1 . 5 Although careful to state the preceding proposition
in the conditional (a waivable interest will not help the artist, she
says, if he is in a poor bargaining position), Schulder seems to ac-
cept the notion that artists as a class are poor and impoverished and
therefore necessarily in a poor bargaining position. 126 Such an esti-
121 A.R. Ammons, Making Change, 38 EPOCH 138 (1989).
122 Cf. Ashley, supra note 95, at 254-55 (an informed artist might reject the paternal-
istic, compulsory droit de suite).
123 Most rights protected by the Copyright Act may be assigned; the Act only re-
quires that the transfer be made explicitly and in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (1988).
124 See Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 110, at 53; Schulder, supra note 86, at 37-39.
125 Schulder, supra note 86, at 39.
126 Id. at 23-24. Schulder conicludes that everyonebut art dealers will react posi-
tively to her proposed art proceeds act; the artist will have a fair share, the collector will
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mation of the visual artist's bargaining position may also be
influenced by an all too ready acceptance of the standard belief
that visual artists are devoted 'to the production of singular
"originals."1 27
In large measure, however, the proposition that visual artists
are in poor bargaining positions, and that therefore a waivable pro-
ceeds right would not be useful, follows from the droit de suite's ro-
mantic stereotype of the impoverished artist. As Monroe Price
noted skeptically in 1968, "[a]t [the droit de suite's] core is a vision of
the starving artist, with his genius unappreciated, using his last pen-
nies to purchase canvas and pigments which he turns into a misun-
derstood masterpiece."' 128 From such vision, or stereotype, follows
both the urgent need for and the peculiar inalienable form of a right
like the droit de suite.
Noting that too many assumptions about the workings of the art
market and the financial plight of visual artists hamper the debate
over resale royalties, Stephen Weil has written: "Rather than such
assumptions, what is truly needed, and what we have never had, is a
thorough study of the art market that could serve as a sound basis
for determining some appropriate remedies." 129 Until such a com-
prehensive study is achieved,'8 0 it remains unclear whether artists in
be more certain of the authenticity of his work, and the public will find the amount of the
proceeds reasonable. Id. at 43.
127 See, e.g., id. at 24-25 (artist is harmed because in his medium the original must be
sold); Hauser, supra note 86, at 2. Hauser noted:
Copyright protection is given to a creator against any unauthorized
reproduction, performance, or exhibition of his work; consequently, the
writer or composer generally reserves some pecuniary benefits unto him-
self when he alienates these exclusive rights of reproduction and per-
formance. In contrast, the artist sells an object, rather than intangible
rights, much as if he alienated a suit of clothes he had tailored. There is
nothing, practically speaking, that he can reserve unto himself, for the
painting cannot be exploited in the broad sense of the word.
Id (footnote omitted).
Note how Hauser lists three protected events (reproduction, performance, and ex-
hibition) and then explicitly aligns only the first two events with the appropriate kind of
artist (writer/reproduction, composer/performance). Understandably, Hauser resists
the artist/exhibition correlation which her own grammatical structure suggests.
128 Monroe E. Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the
Droit de Suite, 77 YALE LJ. 1333, 1335 (1968). Price continued:
The painting is sold for a pittance, probably to buy medicine for a tuber-
cular wife. The purchaser is a canny investor who travels about artists'
hovels trying to pick up bargains which he will later turn into large
amounts of cash. Thirty years later the artist is still without funds and his
children are in rags; meanwhile his paintings, now the subject of a Mu-
seum of Modem Art retrospective and a Harry Abrams parlor-table book,
fetch small fortunes at Park-Bernet and Christie's.
Id. (footnote omitted).
129 S. WELL, supra note 89, at 225.
130 A limited study on the plight of artists has been made. See Randall K. Filer, The
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general are more or less financially secure than the population as a
whole. If such a study is undertaken, it might also resolve the ques-
tion of whether visual artists (particularly those visual artists who
might have their work resold) are so uniquely and especially impov-
erished that they need legal protection not afforded literary and mu-
sical artists. The proposition that visual artists merit some kind of
copyright royalty is already tenable, out of a concern for the integ-
rity and rationality of the Copyright Act. But before Congress man-
dates an inalienable royalty for visual artists, proponents should
demonstrate the need for lack of an inviolable royalty and not sim-
ply for lack of a conventional one.
B. The Exhibition Royalty
Part I suggested that one might consider the act of viewing as a
"copying," 131 and that the display of a work of art might be consid-
ered a "performance," insofar as the work maintains a presence.13 2
Part I also noted that the Copyright Act already construes "copy"
broadly to include all manner of performances, and demonstrated
that, but for section 109(c) of the Copyright Act, visual artists would
already have the basic right from which they could base a royalty.
As Part II already suggests, the event of resale remains an option for
those who wish to fix a royalty for visual artists. In fact, resale is
heretofore the only event on which royalties for visual artists have
been proposed.133 Resale will, and perhaps should, continue to be
considered, but, as argued in previous sections of this Note, any
resale-based royalty proposal should be relieved of the burden of
inalienability.
There are reasons, however, why a royalty for visual artists
would be better fixed on the event of display than on the event of
resale. This subpart begins by explicating some of these reasons.
The subpart then examines the definition of the display right in the
Copyright Act, to consider the appropriateness of its scope and to
consider further precise limitations on what events might trigger a
royalty. The subpart also broaches the possibility of a "fair use"
exemption for museums from the artist's public display right, but
explains why museums should not merit such an exemption. The
subpart then briefly describes how a display-based royalty might be
"Starving Artist"--Myth or Reality? Earnings of Artists in the United States, 94J. POL. ECoN.
56, 73 (1986) (1980 census and other data indicate artists do not "earn any less on
average than they would in other jobs").
131 See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
133 See supra notes 86, 90, 100, and accompanying text, and note 110.
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enforced privately, in a manner analogous to the enforcement of
musical performing rights.
1. Advantages of a Display-Based Right
A royalty for visual artists would be better fixed on the event of
display than on the event of resale. A display right would hardly
disrupt the current form of the law, whereas the resale proceeds
right would require substantial redrafting of the entire Copyright
Act. The display right is already defined in the Act, at section
106(5). To make a display-based royalty possible, Congress need
only repeal section 109(c), and perhaps modify notice procedures to
make copyright protections more attractive to those artists who
would resist placing the word "copyright" or the copyright symbol
on their work.
A resale proceeds right, in contrast, would involve exhaustive
amendment. The 1987 bill proposed by Senator Kennedy and Rep-
resentative Markey is instructive on this point. Among other
changes, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987 would have required:
(1) several new definitions in section 101, so as to accommodate
new concepts without precedent in the current Act;134 (2) substan-
tial new subsections within section 106, so as to define the proceed
right and to carefully attenuate standard copyright terms (such as
"copyright owner") in order to make the proceed right inaliena-
ble;135 and (3) introduction of the need to determine fair market
values for property received in exchange for a work of art, so that
the proceed right might not be avoided by the structuring of non-
cash transactions.13 6
Among the required definitional changes, one is of particularly
doubtful merit. In order to effectuate the proceeds royalty, both the
California Act and the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987 find it nec-
essary to define a new category: the work of "fine art." 13 7 This cat-
134 S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 100, § 2; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 137-40.
135 S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 100, § 3.
136 Id. ("Such royalty shall be equal to 7 percent of the difference between the
seller's purchase price and the amount the seller receives in exchange for work."). Cf.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 986(b)(5) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (exempting from the proceeds
right those exchanges amounting to less than $1000, including the "fair market value"
of property exchanged).
137 CAL. CiV. CODE § 986(c)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (" 'Fine art' means an
original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass."); S. 1619,
100th Cong., Ist Sess. supra note 100, § 2.
Senator Kennedy and Representative Markey's current bill, the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1989, avoids the term "fine art" but in fact refines the definition of art worthy of
protection to exclude arguably more than the 1987 bill would have. The new category is
"work of visual art," and it includes paintings, drawings, prints, sculpture, "or still pho-
tographic image[s] produced for exhibition purposes only," and expressly excludes,
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egory is more restrictive than the "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" category of the current Copyright Act. The Act's category is
not discriminating enough for the proponents of a proceeds
right, l38 who apparently do not wish to extend such a right to works
which are not recognized as culturally important. Indeed, the defi-
nition of "work of fine art" in the 1987 bill would portend no little
government involvement' 3 9 in deciding what visual art is or is not
worthy of protection. The bill provides:
A "work of fine art" is a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work of
recognized stature. In determining whether a work is of recog-
nized stature, a court or other trier of fact may take into account
the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators
of art museums, restorers and conservators of fine art, and other
persons involved with the creation, appreciation, history, or mar-
keting of fine art.140
Obviously, any copyright protection must involve discriminat-
ing definitions, and those definitions will invariably require an eval-
uation of an object's character. Under the current act, for instance,
a court may still have to determine whether an object represents a
"sculptural work."' 14 1 A definition to support an effective proceeds
right, however, seems more susceptible to the prejudices of an insti-
tutionalized art establishment. If the droit de suite's romantic artist
yet exists, he might likely be an outsider to the world of art institu-
among other things, posters, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, advertising, and
packaging material. S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 106, § 2. It should be
remembered that these definitions would serve the purpose of restricting moral rights,
as the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989 has no resale royalty component. See supra text
accompanying notes 105-09.
138 Nor was the Act's definition meant to be so discriminating. The House Report to
the 1976 amendments states:
[Tihe definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" carries with
it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality.
The term is intended to comprise not only "works of art" in the tradi-
tional sense but also works of graphic art and illustration, art reproduc-
tions, plans and drawings, photographs and reproductions of them,
maps, charts, globes, and other cartographic works, works of these kinds
intended for use in advertising and commerce, and works of "applied
art."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & An-
MIN. NEws 5659, 5667.
139 See Siegel, supra note 112, at 17 (resale royalties require governmental definition
of "fine art").
140 S. 1619, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., supra note 100, § 2. The Visual Artists Rights
Amendment of 1989 retains essentially the same standard for determination of recog-
nized stature, for the purposes of the integrity right. S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
supra note 106, § 3.
141 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (statues intended for use as
lamps may be copyrighted as "works of art").
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tions and curators. 142 More to the point, his work might not count
as "fine art" of "recognized stature" in instances where it yet might
dearly be "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work." The latter
phrase, somewhat less evaluative if ultimately also discriminating, is
more compatible with a Copyright Act that does not ask, for in-
stance, whether books to be copyrighted are of "recognized literary
merit." 143
This compatibility with the current Act is intertwined with an-
other advantage of a display-based royalty: The legitimacy of the
display right does not depend on the existence of an impoverished
community of visual artists. The display right simply accords visual
artists a right comparable to those already enjoyed by other artists.
Unlike the inalienable droit de suite, if the display right seems of lim-
ited utility, the artist may assign or expressly waive it. The right
simply allocates to the artist the same right it allocates to the com-
poser or writer: the benefit of a presumption, which she may offer
to the market.
2. Framing the Display Right
As noted in the previous subsection, Congress could base the
"exhibition royalty" on a right already defined in the Copyright Act,
the section 106(5) exclusive right to public display. This section ex-
amines the limitations imposed by the Copyright Act's definition of
the public display right and concludes that in its present form it may
already restrict royalties to appropriate "performing" or display
events. The section argues, however, against "fair use" encroach-
ment of the public display right by nonprofit museums.
a. The "Public" Limitation
As demonstrated in Part I, Congress could base a royalty for
142 Cf. HAL FOSTER, Subversive Signs, in RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL PoLi-
TICS 101 (art is displaced by the institutions which supposedly support it).
143 Cf. Justice Holmes's famous majority opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903):
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves as final judges of the worth of pictorial illus-
trations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one
extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their
very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the
new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted,
for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet
would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of
any public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say that
they have not an aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt.
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visual artists on the current display right of section 106(5).'4 Ar-
guably, the right of section 106(5) is too broad and may encompass
displays that ought not occasion a royalty. Note, however, that the
display right applies only to public displays of a work. Referencing
the definitional section, one finds that to "display a work 'publicly'
means ... to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at
any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a nor-
mal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered."1 45
This definition could operate as an initial restriction on the display
right.
Some may find additional restrictions on the display right desir-
able.146 Further restrictions should distinguish between those
events which would justify a royalty and those which would not.
The precise lines of distinction are not obvious, but the following
questions may serve as a guide. What sort of a public display consti-
tutes a "performance" of the original, authentic "work of art?" For
what kind of public displays do others advertise or charge admis-
sion?147 If the restriction, "public," does not already accomplish it,
we should attempt to arrive at a royalty based on those formal and
relatively extraordinary events we might call "exhibition." 148 A fur-
ther restricting principle might be stated as follows: We wish to
protect the copyright owner's interest in those viewings of her work
which render it a "copy" of itself, in the sense that by the particular
display in question it serves another's purpose, one perhaps ascriba-
ble to a curator 149 or the motive of a promoter for profit.' 50
144 See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
145 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
146 But see Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 110, at 50-51, who find the "public" qualifica-
tion of the display right too restrictive:
While the droit de suite is phrased in terms of the resale of the material
copy, it is, in actuality, the private display of the work to a new purchaser,
his or her family, and social acquaintances that is the compensable event.
The resale is merely a convenient measure of that event .... Unfortu-
nately the measure (resale) has been confused with the compensable
event (private display).
147 The Copyright Act sanctions the "fair use" of a copyrighted work, including re-
production "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching[,] ...
scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a use is "fair" include "the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."
Id. § 107(1); see also infra text accompanying notes 151-52.
148 Ironically, the event of resale, or at least those resales accomplished through the
fanfare of auctions, might fall within the "exhibition" category.
149 See ALMA S. WrrrN, MUSEUMS: IN SEARCH OF A USABLE FUTURE 60-74 (1970).
Exhibitors present objects in collections in the form of monologues or in the form of
dialogues and discussion. Id. at 60. The latter form of presentation has been used "to
convey messages to individuals and to groups of people ...." Id. at 69.
150 So stated, this principle correlates with the artist's power to refuse to assign the
display right, or to selectively license the public display of her work. Accordingly, in
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b. Museums and Unfair Use
The current Copyright Act contains other, specific limitations
on a copyright owner's exclusive rights. For example, "perform-
ance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the course of
face-to-face teaching activities of a non-profit educational institu-
tion" cannot constitute copyright infringement under the Act.' 5'
Another provision of the Act gives qualified approval to certain per-
formances made "without any purpose of direct or indirect commer-
cial advantage . *... ,,52 While these and other limitations on
exclusive Copyright Act rights are somewhat arbitrary, most of the
sanctioned infringements (or, "uses" of another's copyrighted
work) fall to the benefit of nonprofit charitable or educational users.
Discerning from these examples a pattern of Copyright Act
sanction of nonprofit and educational infringements, one might
limit the display right by presuming that the Act should exempt
nonprofit museums 53 from the artist's exclusive right to display.
Assuming that museums perform an educational function,154 it
could be argued that the Copyright Act should not inhibit that func-
tion when carried out on a nonprofit basis. Such an argument fails
for several reasons. First and foremost, the Copyright Act does not
in fact generally excuse infringement for the sake of worthy non-
commercial activity.' 55 Moreover, museums may not be primarily
educational or otherwise charitable institutions worthy of subsidy.
Lastly, even to the extent that museums may perform educational or
charitable functions worthy of subsidy, the visual artists whose work
the museums exhibit should not be forced to bear that subsidy's
addition to using the display right to negotiate royalties, the artist might also reserve the
display right to herself to prevent any exhibition of her work which she might find
objectionable.
151 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1988); cf. id. § 110(3) (exempting displays "in the course of
services at a place of worship or other religious assembly").
152 Id § 110(4). The copyright owner may serve advance notice of objection, in
which case the Act's sanction of the use no longer applies. Id. § 110(4)(B).
153 The Director of the American Association of Museums has stated that more than
two-thirds of the Association's member museums are private, nonprofit institutions.
Lawrence L. Reger, Museumsfor the 21st Century, in THE AMERICAN MUSEUM EXPERIENCE
93, 96 (1986).
154 See KENNETH HUDSON, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MUSEUMS: WHAT THE VIsrroRs
THOUGHT 48-73 (1975) (discussion of the thesis that museums are educational instru-
ments); see also S. WEIL, supra note 89, at 34-35 (education is the most frequently cited
public role of museums).
155 See EDMUND W. KrrCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COM-
PETrIVE PROCESS 742 (4th ed. 1989):
Does the fact that infringement is undertaken in support of a particularly
worthy or useful activity excuse the infringement? As a general matter,
the answer is no. Sponsors of a charity benefit cannot make use of the
popular songs of the day without paying a license fee simply because the
fee will decrease the net amount raised.
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cost.'
56
The cause of education is often used to legitimize museum op-
erations. 157 However, even granting that museums do perform an
educational function, it should be admitted that museums also per-
form noneducational and noncharitable functions.' 58 Museums
serve the civic purpose of attracting tourists to a metropolitan
area. 15 9 Museums furthermore cater to the needs of a status-
conscious class of society. 160 Museums also support the livelihoods
of many persons, including curators, conservators, critics, academ-
ics, and other supporting professionals, who are drawn to the art
world for their own reasons and are not per se deserving of subsidy.
Perhaps most significantly, museums offer entertainment, and not
simply the sort of entertainment people might find at the movies.
As Wittlin states succinctly, museums "are unique in offering to
people immediate encounters with authenticity."'16'
The last reason against a museum exemption is an equitable
one. Skeptical though he was of the droit de suite, Monroe Price
found compelling the argument that, without any economic lever-
age, artists were effectively in the position of subsidizing their own
exhibitions. For illustrative purposes, Price discussed a show,
"Sculpture of the Sixties," at the Los Angeles County Museum of
Art:
About fifty living sculptors took part in the show, some absorbing
the expense of creating an object precisely for the exhibition. The
show, for the most part, was held in [an enclosed gallery] ... with
all viewers, except museum members, paying an extra fee to see
the special exhibit. It was dear that the viewers were coming to
see that particular show and were willing to pay a certain fee to
156 Of course, nothing should prevent the artist who wishes to contribute to the
institution which exhibits her work from doing so by waiving her royalty right.
157 See, e.g., J. Revell Carr, Education Everywhere for Everyone at Mystic Seaport, in THE
AMERICAN MUSEUM EXPERIENCE 41 (1986); see also K. HUDSON, supra note 154, at 48-73.
158 This fact is not lost on the Congress, if the Internal Revenue Code may be taken
as an indication. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-513(a) (1989) (making taxable that income which
charities or educational institutions derive from trade or business unrelated to the func-
tions which make the institutions tax-exempt).
159 SeeJ. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 53, at 645.
160 See Max Kozloff, The Contemporary Museum: Under the Coporate Wing, reprinted in
MusEuMs IN CRISIS 145, 159 (Brian O'Doherty ed. 1972):
Regardless of whether there are any or enough artists worth being
shown, regardless of a community's consciousness of or interest in art,
regardless of a people's social priorities, museum buildings sprout up to
adorn the pride of the colorless ruling classes. In that sense, they are no
different from the moon shots, although requiring far less national
expenditure.
Cf. A. WrrrLIN, supra note 149, at 213-15 (museums risk their identity by conducting too
many activities for the sake of an elite membership class).
161 A. WrrrLuN, supra note 149, at 2; see supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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see it. The proceeds went entirely to the museum. Similarly, the
catalogue, which enjoyed a brisk sale, financially benefited only
the museum in an immediate financial sense.162
It serves no answer to Price's point to say that the artist should be
content with the financial rewards that will result from museum ex-
posure of her work. As Price noted, many professionals furnish
"free" services for promotional reasons, "[b]ut for artists and sculp-
tors, the institutionalization of the process of uncompensated exhi-
bition has deprived them of the choice of whether a show of his
works should be income producing or not .... ',163 Museums al-
ready receive enormous subsidies from the federal government in
the form of grants.164 Other legislation also inures to the benefit of
museums.' 65 If museums are still wanting financially, they should
perhaps look to their clientele (or unwitting pupils, as the case may
be).166 Artists should not be forced to subsidize museum
operations.
&' Enforcement Mechanisms
As John E. McInerney has pointed out, the 1982 amendments
to the California Resale Royalties Act now enable artists to enforce
their rights under the Act through privately-run agencies, analogous
to performing-right organizations such as the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. ("BMI"). 167 ASCAP and BMI operate by obtaining nonex-
clusive rights from copyright owners to license performances of the
copyright owner's work. Purchasers of a license from a performing-
right organization gain the right to perform the compositions
162 Price, supra note 128, at 1353.
163 Id. at 1355 n.57.
164 In one recent two-year period, federal grants to museums totalled $115,582,367.
INSTITUTE OF MUSEUM SERVICES ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL ON THE ARTS AND
THE HUMANITIES, THE NATURE AND LEVEL OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR MUSEUMS IN FISCAL
YEARS 1985 AND 1986, at cover letter (1988). Twenty-seven programs in five federal
agencies provide the major portion of this federal assistance. See id. at 15.
165 See, e.g., The Art and Artifacts Indemnity Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-158 (codi-
fied at 20 U.S.C. § § 971-977 (1990)) (authorizing federal indemnification of art exhibits
against loss or damage).
166 Cf. A. WrrruLN, supra note 149, at 214:
There is no reason whatsoever to doubt the willingness of the public to
pay for admission to museums; a visit would still be a bargain if compared
with a ticket to a movie theater or to a concert. Visitors would, however,
probably expect better evidence of the quality of a museum's offerings
than they do now when few are aware of the indirect contribution they
make to a tax-supported institution; a direct cash transaction tends to
arouse alertness which in its turn may lead to ajudiciously critical attitude
which is now missing.
167 McInerney, supra note 9, at 18-19.
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owned by all the copyright owners the organization represents. o' s A
visual artists' royalty organization could work similarly. Artists
could grant the organization the nonexclusive t69 right to license ex-
hibitions of their work, and the organization could collectively per-
form the functions of monitoring exhibitions and assessing and
collecting royalties on behalf of the artists, or whomever might own
the copyright of a particular work. Exhibitors would be licensees,
purchasers of a temporary use of the exclusive display right.
Exhibitions, moreover, should prove easier to track than every
resale, public and private, with which a resale royalty enforcement
agency would have to contend. Indeed, the task of logging and as-
sessing royalties for every public exhibition should be less daunting
than the task the music performing rights organizations perform. 170
As a practical matter, ASCAP and BMI do not directly record each
and every performance of each and every work in their catalogs;171 a
visual artist's exhibition royalty organization, however, might better
approximate actual figures for the display of particular works in par-
ticular museums and galleries. 172
168 A somewhat fuller summary of the operations of ASCAP and BMI may be found
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979):
As ASCAP operates today, its 22,000 members grant it nonexclusive
rights to license nondramatic performances of their works, and ASCAP
issues licenses and distributes royalties to copyright owners in accord-
ance with a schedule reflecting the nature and amount of the use of their
music and other factors. BMI ... operates in much the same manner as
ASCAP....
Both organizations operate primarily through blanket licenses, which
give the licensees the right to perform any and all of the compositions
owned by members or affiliates as often as the licensees desire for a
stated term. Fees for blanket licenses are ordinarily a percentage of the
total revenues or a flat dollar amount, and do not directly depend on the
amount or type of music used. Radio and television broadcasters are the
largest users of music, and almost all of them hold blanket licenses from
both ASCAP and BMI.
For a more extended description, see SIDNEY SHEMEL & WILIAM S. KRASILOVSKY, THIS
BUSINESS OF Music 162-78 (rev. ed. 1977).
169 "Nonexclusive," meaning an artist might also directly license display of her work
herself. ASCAP and BMI allow an individual member to grant licenses for his work on
an individual basis. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 11.
170 This assumes that more songs are played on radio and television than paintings
and sculptures are exhibited in galleries and museums. The assumption may be false, or
unduly based on the theory of authenticity informing the common belief ihat paintings
are "one of a kind." That is, the assumption may rest on the following deduction: be-
cause works of art are unique they must necessarily be rare. As John Ashbery reminds
us, however, "paintings are one thing we never seem to run out of." JOHN ASHBERY, A
WAvE 16 (1984).
171 Statistical sampling and other methods are used to approximate numbers of per-
formances. See S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 168, at 165-66.
172 An alternative to a private enforcement agency might be the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, established by Congress in the 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act for the
purpose of establishing and collecting compulsory license fees for cable television, pho-
nographic records, juke boxes, and public broadcasting. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111-116
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CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR THE ROYALTY
On the question of the need for a royalty for visual artists, pro-
ponents of the droit de suite have misdirected our attention. One
need not demonstrate the financial plight of writers to justify their
royalties. The question is really one of horizontal equity. The
Copyright Act broadly states that it protects pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural work, and has since 1976 conceptualized a display right
on which a royalty for visual artists might be based. In other provi-
sions, however, the Act frustrates both its own general purpose and
the conceptual breakthrough represented by the section 106(5) dis-
play right.
The House Report to the 1976 amendments of the Copyright
Act stated that the Copyright Act has often expanded its scope so as
to accommodate new forms of expression. But the report also ac-
knowledged that the Act sometimes reached back to recognize older
forms:
The historic expansion of copyright has also applied to forms
of expression which, although in existence for generations or cen-
turies, have only gradually come to be recognized as creative and
worthy of protection. The first copyright statute in this country,
enacted in 1790, designated only "maps, charts, and books";
major forms of expression such as music, drama, and works of
art achieved specific statutory recognition only in later
enactments.173
But the report is misleading. Although Congress has conferred
"statutory recognition" upon works of visual art since 1870,174 it
has yet to grant meaningful protection to the authors of visual art.
With respect to no other art form has Congress so divorced protec-
tion of the form from the interests of the form's creators.
For their part, and although they obviously desire a royalty for
visual artists, even the proponents of the droit de suite presume im-
pediments in the Copyright Act. 175 These impediments are facile
and are presumed for no better reason than want of adequate analy-
sis. Authentic, one-of-a-kind art "objects" are "performing" and in
that sense "copied" all the time and in ways analogous to other
events the Copyright Act protects for the sake of other kinds of art-
ists. It would do no violence to the Act to allow it to accommodate a
(1988). This Note does not favor this alternative, but rather prefers that visual artists be
afforded the same negotiating opportunities traditionally afforded writers and
composers.
173 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5664-65.
174 See supra note 6.
175 See supra note 127.
1991]
CORNELL LI W REVIEW
royalty for visual artists. On the contrary, such a royalty could make
the Act more consistent: Congress could base the royalty on the
Act's own conceptualization of a right of display, and could utilize
the Act's own normative provisions on transfer of ownership. A roy-
alty for visual artists is certainly not so radical an idea that it need
follow the example of the droit de suite.
William A. Carleton, IIIt
t A.B., Lafeyette College, 1983; M.F.A. English, Cornell University, 1986. Many
thanks to my editor, Jay Holtmeier. I dedicate this Note to Maria Maldonado.
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